On my way out to a soccer game, my wife anxiously showed me some clips of Dieter Uchtdorf, in the First Presidency of the LDS Church, speaking to the Relief Society. He expressed some simple powerful ideas that merit regular emphasis:

1) Two primary characteristics of God are creation and compassion.

2) We worship through emulation, which need not pretend to perfection.

Imagine the practical consequences of such ideas, deeply internalized in the hearts and minds of a community. My children can understand and act on this: we teach of a God that loves and works to make better worlds, and we should try to do the same. Below are a video clip of part of the talk, a full recording, and a link to a transcript.





Transcript of "Happiness, Your Heritage" by Dieter Uchtdorf

Professionally, I'm a software engineering manager, and the area in which I've done the most work is systems integration, particularly between systems management platforms, which enable network administrators to monitor and control many computers without moving away from their desks. To integrate between systems management platforms, we write some software that knows how to talk with each of the platforms and enables them to exchange information. This is valuable because integrated platforms can thereafter leverage each other's strengths and thereby increase the overall value of owning both platforms. Without the integration software, the platforms must act independently, sometimes duplicating efforts, and often forcing administrators to waste their time doing unnecessary work. For example, suppose you have a systems management platform that monitors the performance of all the computers on your network and can alert you when their performance degrades. Suppose also that you have another systems management platform that enables you to remote control any computer on the network. Before the two are integrated, whenever the first platform alerts you of a problem, you would have to note the name of the computer, open a console for the second platform, search for the poorly performing computer, and finally take control to check for and remedy problems. However, subsequent to integrating the platforms, you may be able to click on a link in the alert from the first platform and immediately take control of the poorly performing computer in the console of the second platform -- no error-prone notes or time-consuming searches. Over time, the integration will enable higher productivity.

I often look at human ideologies as being analogous to systems management platforms. Like systems management platforms, which enable us to make sense of and act sensibly within network environments, ideologies enable us to make sense of and act sensibly within our world. Although far more complex than systems management platforms, ideologies are still symbol systems -- sets of inter-related information, codes, laws, words, and the like. Also like systems management platforms, ideologies often are unable to exchange information easily among themselves, without assistance from some kind of additional integrating or syncretizing ideology.

I often look at Mormonism as a means of integrating two highly-influential ideologies: Judeo-Christian religion and Enlightenment philosophy. Mormonism takes many of the symbols from each of these ideologies, and maps them into symbols in the other. For example, the God of Judeo-Christian religion gets mapped into something that Enlightenment philosophy might identify as an advanced powerful material being; and Enlightenment philosophy's expected dramatic increases in human knowledge and power get mapped into something that Judeo-Christian religion might identify as the millennium. Of course, such integrations between ideologies are also occurring beyond Mormonism, but Mormonism provides more integration points between Judeo-Christian religion and Enlightenment philosophy than any other ideology with which I'm familiar.

Integrations can be complex and messy. Sometimes data in one symbol system doesn't map as well as one would like into the other system. Other times the integrators make relatively poor decisions regarding how to implement an integration. Always, an integration can be improved as the integrators become increasingly familiar with the systems they're integrating. This is true of Mormonism, whose mappings between the Judeo-Christian religion and Enlightenment philosophy have various limitations.

Yet, beyond the limitations, the integrated ideologies enable persons to leverage the strengths of each with less difficulty. As a Mormon, I've often found that it appears to be easier for me to embrace science than it may be for most other Judeo-Christians I've observed. Likewise, I feel that I'm more able to benefit from the esthetic of religion than most Enlightenment-oriented persons I've encountered. I value much in both ideologies, and my Mormonism often helps me do so with greater consistency than I might otherwise have been capable of.

The Faith Position
Abstract: For practical reasons, we should trust that we probably will not go extinct before becoming an advanced civilization.
F1) we probably will not go extinct before becoming an advanced civilization [assumption]
To read a discussion of the faith position, see this post.
The Creation Argument
Abstract: If any advanced civilization probably creates many worlds like those in its past then we should trust an advanced civilization probably created our world.
C1) EITHER we probably will go extinct before becoming an advanced civilization OR any advanced civilization probably does not simulate many worlds like those in its past OR an advanced civilization probably simulated our world [simulation argument]
C2) EITHER we probably will go extinct before becoming an advanced civilization OR any advanced civilization probably does not create many worlds like those in its past OR an advanced civilization probably created our world [generalization of C1]
C3) any advanced civilization probably creates many worlds like those in its past [assumption]
C4) EITHER we probably will go extinct before becoming an advanced civilization OR an advanced civilization probably created our world [from C2 and C3]
C5) an advanced civilization probably created our world [from C4 and F1]
A common task to which computers are applied today is that of simulation. Flight and automobile simulators have been available both to the military and for entertainment for many years. Financial simulators have become important for investors, as medical simulators have improved our ability to train surgeons. Many persons enjoy playing games such as SimCity that simulate urban planning. Entire worlds are simulated, for both scientific and entertainment purposes, such as the popular virtual worlds, World of Warcraft and Second Life, in which persons buy and sell real estate, hold meetings, even dance, and generally engage in a virtual life through the proxy of their avatars. Over time, the quality of simulations has greatly improved. Users of early flight simulators saw only bumpy black and white outlines of abstract geometric features representing terrain above an equally coarse rendition of a cockpit. Today, full-color, three-dimensional geographies and other aircraft can be wrapped around a user inside a machine that moves to provide for realistic physical sensations.
As the computing power available to us continues to advance exponentially, it seems reasonable to suppose that one of the things we might do is run increasingly detailed simulations of our world and worlds like it. As the level of detail increases and the user interface improves, it would become ever more difficult to discern any difference between our world and the simulated worlds, to the point that, for all practical purposes, "simulation" or "virtual" would no longer accurately describe those worlds or the apparently sentient persons in them. Furthermore, if an advanced civilization simulates many such worlds, indistinguishable in degree of detail from its own world, then the advanced civilization itself is much more likely to be one of many simulated worlds than it is to be the only hypothetical non-simulated world. In other words, an advanced civilization that simulates many worlds like those in its past is almost certainly not the first or only to do so, and thus is probably simulated itself. This is the simulation argument, that at least one of these three propositions must be true: either we probably will go extinct before becoming an advanced civilization or any advanced civilization probably does not simulate many worlds like those in its past or an advanced civilization probably simulated our world.
We can generalize the simulation argument. Its form remains valid regardless of the particular creative process to which it's applied. For example, for the same reasons that the simulation argument is valid, terraforming or cosmoforming arguments would be valid: either we probably will go extinct before becoming an advanced civilization or any civilization probably does not terraform or cosmoform many worlds like those in its past or an advanced civilization probably terraformed or cosmoformed our world. Extrapolating from these examples, we formulate a generalized argument: either we probably will go extinct before becoming an advanced civilization or any advanced civilization probably does not create many worlds like those in its past or an advanced civilization probably created our world.
Notice that the generalized argument in no way contradicts evolution theory, either logically or empirically. To the contrary, although the generalized argument remains valid across all the particular creative processes to which it might be applied, it may prove infeasible in many variations. In particular, variations of the generalized argument that contradict empirical evidence should be discarded, despite their logical validity.
It seems reasonable to suppose that any advanced civilization actually does create many worlds like those in its past. As mentioned previously, our civilization has already implemented innumerable simulations of worlds like our own with rapidly increasing detail. We're also hard at work researching processes for space colonization, and even studying the processes by which our universe was formed. Given the diverse ways in which an advanced civilization might prove capable of creating many worlds like those in its past, it's hard to imagine that any advanced civilization would prove incapable of doing so. Moreover, if capable, it's even harder to imagine that they would uniformly choose not to do so. So choose your favorite creative process, whatever appeals most to your sense of feasibility. If you expect our civilization, assuming we do not go extinct first, will somehow prove capable of creating many worlds like our own then we may proceed together to the consequence of our expectation.
If any advanced civilization probably creates many worlds like those in its past then, according to the simulation argument, either we probably will go extinct before becoming an advanced civilization or an advanced civilization probably created our world. Given the faith position, we choose to deny the probability that we will go extinct before becoming an advanced civilization, and so should trust that an advanced civilization probably created our world.
If ever we create many worlds like our own, we almost certainly would not be the first or only civilization to do so. Our perspective regarding our origin should account for our expectation regarding our creative potential. It would be remarkably inconsistent and extremely improbable to assert that we will eventually create many worlds like our own without also acknowledging that an advanced civilization probably created our world.
To read additional discussion of the creation argument, see this post.

The New York Times reports that remembering may be like reliving, from the perspective of the neurons doing the remembering. Remembering neurons appear to behave like they did when first experiencing whatever is being remembered. I wonder, if our brains could quickly store more information in a readily accessible manner, and if our eyes and ears (and the remainder of our body) could reproduce their states from that stored information, perhaps remembering would be no different than reliving for the entire organism? To remember is to simulate the past. At radical degrees, to remember is to recreate the past. In the distant future, perhaps a neohuman remembering our world would, through the act of remembering, reproduce our world. As I've mentioned before, there seems to be little reason to distinguish between a neohuman and a universe.

Coincident with our recent presentation of the New God Argument, a leading evangelical Christian, Albert Mohler, wrote a blog entry entitled "New God or No God? The Peril of Making God Plausible". In the entry, he reviews a book by Mitchell Silver, who suggests that liberal theologians have been working to replace the "'old God' of biblical theism" with the "'new God' of the secular philosophers". Mohler, identifying with the old God theology, contrasts the two theological perspectives, explicitly or implicitly, as follows:

Old God
1) Biblical
2) Personal
3) Supernatural
4) Theistic
5) Specific
6) Literal
7) Traditional
8) Powerful

New God
1) Secular Philosophy
2) Principle
3) Natural
4) Atheistic
5) Equivocal
6) Metaphoric
7) Popular
8) Impotent

The new God described in Mohler's blog entry is not the God proposed by the New God Argument. Moreover, the New God Argument does not contend to propose a new God. Rather, it contends to be a new argument for a particular kind of God that is not new at all, but rather quite ancient. The new God described in Mohler's blog entry is the God of some liberal protestants. Although I may agree with some aspects of their perspective, as I may agree with some aspects of Mohler's perspective, the liberal protestant perspective is not one I would wholly defend. That aside, I do want to comment on each of the contrasts Mohler identified:

1) If the old God is the God preached by traditional Christianity then it is not only a biblical God, but also a secular philosophical God. Christian theology has been repeatedly reconciled with the popular secular philosophy of its day, beginning with neo-Platonism, through Scholastic Aristotelianism, and on to the various contemporary reconciliations. Mohler's own Southern Baptist Convention is not immune to the interplay between religious and secular philosophy, as evidenced by their basic statement on God: "The eternal triune God reveals Himself to us as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, with distinct personal attributes, but without division of nature, essence, or being." While the Bible does teach of the unity of aspects of God, it does not explicitly teach that the aspects are without division in nature, essence or being. The Southern Baptist Convention can thank the Catholics, who in turn can thank Greek philosophy, for that extra-Biblical interpretation.

2) With Mohler, I see less value in an impersonal God. However, one need not look only to traditional or conservative Christianity to find faith in a personal God. For example, the God advocated in the New God Argument is a person -- or persons -- and not merely a principle. This God was perhaps once like you and me, and we may perhaps become like this God. As we get to know and become like this God, we may learn to love him. It doesn't get much more personal than that, but it is hardly a traditional or conservative perspective by contemporary measures.

3) I don't know anything about a supernatural God, and neither does anyone else except to the extent that they label as "supernatural" the God they experience and imagine naturally. The distinction between natural and supernatural seems to be largely nonsensical. If it can affect my experience, it's natural, so far as I'm concerned. I may not understand how it affects my experience, but that doesn't mean I should assume it is immaterial or causeless -- euphemisms for "beyond investigation". Such assumptions are lazy and dangerous, preventing us from growing in knowledge.

4) If rejection of supernaturalism and immaterialism is atheism then I and a whole lot of other Mormons are atheists, despite our professed faith in God. As presented in the New God Argument, a powerful benevolent creator can be quite natural and material. For those of us who are natural and material, and who express our worship through emulation, only such a God is worthy of worship.

5) I do not perceive the God presented by the Bible, as interpreted by the Southern Baptist Convention or any other religion including my own, to be devoid of ambiguities, paradoxes and some outright contradictions. Despite the powerful inspirational power we find in scriptural texts and our exegesis of them, there is not so much precision as Mohler appears to suggest. If God intended the scriptures to be so precise, perhaps he would have written them in mathematics.

6) The scriptures are rich in symbolism, particularly when describing God. How does one decide where the symbol ends and the literal begins? If Mohler's concern is that some liberal theologians are making God wholly symbolic, I share his concern to the extent that we do not reify our symbols.

7) Today's traditional God is yesterday's popular God, and has been through the ages. Whether traditional or popular, God must be more than we have yet learned, or what's the bother? I don't intend to disregard the value of respect for tradition. To the extent tradition is not oppressive, we can all benefit from respecting it, and seeking to integrate its strengths into our learning process.

8) I agree with Mohler that a God that is merely a symbol is far less powerful than such reified into a personal being. Moreover, although Mohler certainly would not agree, an immaterial or supernatural person is far less powerful than a material natural person. The former is, so far as I can tell, indistinguishable from a symbol. Additionally, a God who would limit the education of his creatures to texts written millennia ago seems less powerful than one that would never cease educating.

While Mohler considers it perilous to make God plausible, I consider it perilous to make God implausible. Is it any wonder that religious adherence suffers when we hold dogmatically to ideas that clash with our experience, and our best efforts at rationality and science? Should we be surprised that the spirit of God fails us when we choose to disavow the ongoing flow of knowledge with which God would inspire us? If we seek to embrace all truth, regardless of its source, we probably will get more of it. We need not pretend to a final understanding of God to aspire to an understanding that is sufficiently plausible to help us take the next steps toward a better understanding.

Will works save you? Some Christians enjoy debating whether good works are necessary for salvation, with responses ranging from the extremes of Calvinism (we can make absolutely no effort, spiritual or physical, toward salvation) to the extremes of Pelagianism (salvation depends almost entirely on our efforts, spiritual and physical). Most Christians situate themselves somewhere between these two extremes. Pentecostals, leaning toward Calvinism, may claim that free-willed faith in Christ is necessary for salvation, but that any works beyond that are not necessary. Mormons, leaning toward Pelagianism, may claim that both the grace of God and our works are necessary for salvation, the former as a context of opportunity for the latter.

Underlying the debate are widely varying perspectives on the nature of salvation, grace, faith and works. What is salvation? To what extent is faith a work? How is grace manifest, to whom and for what reason? Toward what should faith be directed? Does missionary work matter? Yet, despite all these questions, our answers and how we might position ourselves along the ideological line between Calvinism and Pelagianism, Christians almost universally agree that good works are evidence of salvation, whether or not they are necessary. In other words, while you may or may not be saved when evidencing good works, you know you're not saved when NOT evidencing good works.

So here's the wager: bet on better works. In any choice between ideologies, you should choose whichever you think will affect you to evidence better works. To the extent Calvinism is accurate, your choice won't matter either way, as you'll be saved or damned according to criteria relative to which you have absolutely no influence. To the extent Pelagianism is accurate, your better works will save you. From the Pentecostal perspective, although the better works would not save you, they would be evidence that you had embraced the better ideology (which faith in Christ must be, definitionally), which will save you. From the Mormon perspective, the better works are the best use of the gifts and talents, inspiration and endowments, that God has given you, and so will save you according to your wise stewardship.

Bet on better works. Regardless of how you are persuaded to define "salvation" or "better works", the wager stands. One may understand salvation in terms of "happiness" and better works in terms of "benevolence" and "power". Another may understand salvation in terms of "utility" and better works in terms of "ethics" and "technology". Can greater benevolence and power make you happier? Can improved ethics and technology provide increased utility? From a secular pseudo-Calvinist perspective, it doesn't matter whether you are benevolent and powerful or not; either way, something utterly beyond your benevolence and power determines your happiness. In other words, to the extent pseudo-Calvinism is accurate, it can't hurt to bet on benevolence and power. From a secular pseudo-Pelagianist perspective, your utility depends on your ethics and technology. To the extent pseudo-Pelagianism is accurate, it's good to bet on ethics and technology. For the secular pseudo-Pentecostal, although greater benevolence and power aren't making you happier, they're evidence of that which is making you happier. For the secular pseudo-Mormon, although the improved ethics and technology are not sufficient in themselves for utility, they are necessary for greater utility.

In summary, there are three ways of looking at the correlation of good works and salvation (or benevolent power and happiness, or ethical technology and utility):

1) They are not correlated.
2) They are positively correlated, whether or not causally related.
3) They are negatively correlated, whether or not causally related.

Common sense rejects #3, whether or not it should. Moreover, I've never heard anyone seriously and persuasively argue that good works correlate with damnation, that benevolent power correlates with misery, or that ethical technology correlates with inutility.

#1 is of no practical consequence, by definition. Practice is limited to works, power and technology. If good works, benevolent power and ethical technology are no more likely to correlate with salvation, happiness and utility than are evil works, malevolent power and unethical technology then it doesn't matter whether we reject #1, even if we're wrong.

That leaves us with #2. We should embrace the idea that good works correlate with salvation, that benevolent power correlates with happiness, and that ethical technology correlates with utility. Whether or not we think the relation is causal, if we desire salvation, happiness or utility, then we should seek out good works, benevolent power or ethical technology. If the relation is causal then we'll cause fulfillment of our desires. If the relation is not causal then they're still evidence that we've done whatever else is causal.

Bet on better works, benevolent power and ethical technology. In any choice between ideologies, you should choose whichever you think will affect you to evidence better works, greater benevolence and power, increased ethics and advanced technology. If there's anything you can do to achieve salvation, happiness or utility, you probably will have done it when you evidence these things. Of course, there is still plenty of room for debate over what constitutes better works, benevolent power or ethical technology, but we should at least bet on them in general terms.